Economic forecasts and monetary policy by Sandra Pianalto
February 15, 2006
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
Economic Forecasts and Monetary Policy
by Sandra Pianalto
ISSN 0428-1276
Economic forecasts are essential 
tools for monetary policymakers. But
behind the numbers of any given 
forecast, demand- or supply-side 
factors could be at play, each requir-
ing very different policy responses.
For this reason, explains Sandra
Pianalto, the president and chief 
executive officer of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Cleveland, in her 
role as a policymaker it is as impor-
tant to think about why an economic
forecast calls for the economy to head
toward a certain point as it is to know
what that forecasted point is. These
remarks were originally presented to
the Cleveland Association for Business
Economics on February 13, 2006.
Today I would like to share with you
some of my thoughts about economic
forecasts and monetary policy. I will
begin with some comments about the
economy’s recent performance and the
outlook for 2006. Next, I will explain
why making sound policy decisions
requires me to think about both the
demand and supply sides of the econ-
omy. Finally, I will describe how the 
stories behind the forecasts directly
relate to the way I think about the 
appropriate course for monetary policy. 
Please note that the views I express
today are mine alone. I do not presume
to speak for any of my colleagues in the
Federal Reserve System. 
■ Economic Performance and
the 2006 Outlook 
I will set the context for my remarks by
first taking a brief look at our recent eco-
nomic performance and the outlook for
2006. Although the national economy in
2005 was not as strong as it was in 2004,
overall we saw solid growth for the year.
As you know, the economy endured a
series of significant energy-price shocks
that, in earlier eras, might have triggered
a recession. Instead, third-quarter GDP
growth remained strong.
Now, it is true that the advance estimate
for fourth-quarter GDP growth was only
1.1 percent. Some may interpret this
weak performance as a sign that the
energy shocks may have finally taken
their toll. However, we should remind
ourselves that these are preliminary
numbers. Third-quarter GDP growth
was substantially revised upward, so we
may learn in a few weeks that fourth-
quarter growth was not quite as weak as
the initial estimate indicates.
We should also remember that it is fairly
common to miss on forecasts of quarter-
to-quarter economic performance. For
instance, it would not surprise me too
much to look back and see that some of
the growth we thought would occur in
the final three months of last year was
actually spread across the third quarter
of 2005—when GDP growth was
stronger than expected—and the first
quarter or two of this year. 
Please understand that I am not suggest-
ing we should be complacent about the
weak statistic for fourth-quarter growth.
I will be watching the incoming data
very carefully over the next several
months. In fact, the early data for Janu-
ary have been reasonably good. 
Assuming the preliminary fourth-quarter
report holds up, though, GDP still grew
last year by 3.5 percent. For the year as a
whole, it is clear that employment
growth accelerated, business fixed
investment was relatively strong, and
core inflation remained subdued.
What about the outlook for 2006? Most
forecasters are expecting another solid
performance. Forecasts published by
Blue Chip Economic Indicators, the
Congressional Budget Office, and
NABE economists generally call for real
GDP to expand by roughly 3-1/4 to 
3-1/2 percent this year. Housing invest-
ment is generally expected to slow, while
business fixed investment is expected to
increase. These forecasts call for interest
rates, the unemployment rate, and core
inflation to remain steady. I know that at
the meeting last month of the Cleveland
Association for Business Economics,
your three forecasters presented views
that were largely the same. 
No one, of course, is expecting that
every detail of these forecasts will prove
to be precisely accurate. We have to
acknowledge reality: Any forecast is
only as good as our ability to look into
the future and foresee the unforeseeable. 
In fact, the standard deviation of annual
real GDP growth is about 2-1/2 percent-
age points. This means that most of the
time we would expect real GDP growth
to vary in a range that is quite large—
between 1 and 6 percent. Although very
good economic forecasting models can
narrow that range of uncertainty, a fair
amount of uncertainty still remains.
Forecasting is a tough business, leading
some people to question the value of
forecasting altogether. I find forecasts to be helpful. However,
achieving better forecast accuracy is
less important to me as a member of the
Federal Open Market Committee than
understanding the forces that drive the
economy. As a result, although I know
that forecasts tend to be inaccurate—
sometimes very inaccurate—the process
of thinking through those forecasts is
central to the way I do my job. Within
the numbers, I need to look not just at
the “what” but also at the “why.” In
other words, I need to think hard about
the demand- and supply-side assump-
tions that underlie economic forecasts.
■ Thinking about the Demand
and Supply Sides of the
Economy
So let me explain why I believe that
making sound policy decisions requires
me to think about both the demand and
supply sides of the economy. 
Most often, it seems that forecasts are
presented from the demand side—as the
sum of growth in different categories of
spending. In other words, we gauge how
fast consumption spending is likely to
grow, add an estimate of how fast
investment is likely to expand, throw in
a prediction of government spending
growth, include some assumptions
about net exports and, voila, we have a
GDP forecast. But this is really just a
description of what the forecast is, not a
description of why the forecast is what
it is. 
As a policymaker, I am less interested
in a statement like “GDP will grow by
3-1/4 percent,” than I am in answering
the question “Why will GDP grow by 3-
1/4 percent?” I find great value in the
story behind a forecast, even if I suspect
that unforeseen events could prove the
forecast wrong. Both supply and
demand conditions inform the stories
behind the forecasts.
Here is an example. Just recently, a
major newspaper ran an article that
stated: “Largely because consumer
spending slowed to a near halt in the
fourth quarter last year, overall eco-
nomic growth fell.” On the surface, that
statement seems pretty straightforward:
If spending is strong, the economy
grows. If spending is weak, the econ-
omy grows by less. Is that really the best
way to think about U.S. economic per-
formance in 2005?
It is certainly true that GDP growth last
year was off the pace of 2004. But, as we
are all painfully aware, energy prices
rose dramatically over the course of the
year. Consumers saw energy prices rise
about 30 percent by the time they peaked
in September. Clearly, energy-market
disruptions—a supply condition—could
go a long way toward explaining why
economic activity, including consumer
spending, was more restrained than in
the recent past.
So, which interpretation is right? Did
economic growth slow in 2005 because
spending slowed? Or did spending slow
because economic growth was restrained
by a series of large energy-price spikes?
To put it another way, did growth slow
because demand in the economy was too
weak, or did it slow because productive
capacity in the economy was reduced by
adverse supply effects?
For me, from a policymaker’s perspec-
tive, these are important questions. My
job is to help find the course of monetary
policy that is consistent with price stabil-
ity and with the economy operating at
maximum sustainable growth or, in other
words, growing at its potential. This
means that we have to have an idea of
where “potential” is, and we have to be
able to identify factors that affect poten-
tial, as opposed to factors that affect only
aggregate demand. In practice, there
may be circumstances that affect both
demand and potential, but we still must
try to disentangle demand effects from
supply effects. And the reason we must
be able to make these distinctions is that
demand and supply effects can have dif-
ferent implications for the appropriate
course of monetary policy.  
■ The Stories Behind Forecasts
and Monetary Policy
Now I will turn to how the stories behind
the economic forecasts directly relate to
the way I think about the appropriate
course for monetary policy. I use the
term “stories” as a shorthand way of
describing the various hypotheses that
lurk behind the economic data we
receive. Each story that I might consider
rests on some hypothesis about potential
GDP, full employment, and other con-
cepts such as the neutral real rate of
interest. The challenging part of using
these concepts to inform policy deci-
sions is that they are not fixed numbers,
or even fixed ranges of numbers. Their
values themselves are a complicated
function of the supply and demand con-
ditions that I have been discussing.
Former Chairman Greenspan has
expressed skepticism about the ability of
policymakers to translate these concepts
into precise numerical benchmarks. But
the concepts themselves must be taken
into account when the FOMC assesses
the appropriate path for monetary pol-
icy. When you hear policymakers—or 
at least this policymaker—speak of 
concepts like “potential GDP” or “full
employment,” you are really hearing an
attempt to sort out the supply and
demand conditions that frame the 
economic environment.
Thinking through these concepts is not
just an academic exercise. It is a neces-
sary part of creating a framework for
monetary policy decision-making. To
fulfill its mandate, the Federal Reserve
must look not just at the economy’s top-
line performance. We must try to deter-
mine the stories that may be hidden
within the numbers. And, as I said ear-
lier, even though it can be frustrating to
know that our economic forecasts will
likely be inaccurate, we know that the
very process of constructing the stories
behind the forecasts is invaluable.
Let me suggest some concrete examples
to help clarify what I mean. From 1997
through 1999, real GDP growth aver-
aged almost 4.4 percent, which is well
above most traditional estimates of how
fast the economy can grow without
accelerating inflation. But several mem-
bers of the FOMC—among them, for-
mer Chairman Alan Greenspan and
Jerry Jordan, my predecessor as presi-
dent of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Cleveland—argued that growth itself is
not inflationary if it is driven by produc-
tivity gains.
Although they were considering the
same projections that others were study-
ing, Chairman Greenspan, Jerry Jordan,
and the others had a much different pic-
ture of what it meant for inflation. They
saw favorable supply-side conditions as
the cause of the rapid growth, while oth-
ers saw overheated demand conditions.
In my view, history has proven that the
supply-side perspective was correct.
Consider a more recent example. Many
people expected job growth to bounce
back more quickly over the past four
years than it did. Job creation was well
below expectations as the economyemerged from the 2001 recession. Just
how far below was made clear by the
dating of the recession itself. As you
know, a committee sponsored by the
National Bureau of Economic Research
determines the precise timing of the
beginning and the end of recessions.
Although the committee concluded that
the recession ended in November 2001,
it was not until July 2003 that it was
confident enough to make that judg-
ment. The main reason for the delay
was the unusually weak behavior of 
job growth. 
In fact, it took almost four years for the
economy to reach the point where there
were as many people working in the
United States as there were at the begin-
ning of the recession in 2001. It was not
until last year that we reached the mile-
stone of having created 2 million new
jobs in this expansion. A reasonable
interpretation of this period is that
demand for goods and services was not
strong enough to create more robust
demand for workers. That view implies
that the economy had generally been
operating below its potential. If an
economy is operating below its poten-
tial because of weak demand, then a rel-
atively more accommodative monetary
policy is the right medicine—and it can
be administered without fear of stoking
inflation. Indeed, the FOMC followed
this course for a considerable period 
of time.
It is true that even today, new jobs are
still being created more slowly than the
roughly 3 million jobs created each year
between 1994 and 2000. How can we
account for this performance? Does a
demand-side story make the most
sense?  In this case, I think that trends
on the supply side of the economy sug-
gest that we might need to interpret
sluggish labor markets differently
today.
Perhaps the most interesting trend is the
pattern of labor-force participation—
that is, the fraction of people who either
have a job or are actively seeking a job.
Since 2001, the labor-force participa-
tion rate of all age groups, except those
55 and older, has declined. The change
has been especially noticeable among
younger workers—16-to 24-year-olds.
Their participation rates have declined
by about 5 percentage points. That
amounts to 1.9 million young people
who, for now, are no longer potential
workers.
Has this episode of slower employment
growth resulted from demand condi-
tions, supply conditions, or some com-
bination of both? 
If it is defined as a demand condition,
perhaps poor job prospects have dis-
couraged people from even attempting
to find work. Will another year like
2005 reverse the recent trend? And does
that mean that monetary policy should
be accommodative until the economy is
once again generating substantially
more than 2 million new jobs per year? 
Alternatively, if the lower labor-force
participation rate is defined as a supply
condition, then it may be driven by
younger workers deferring their entry
into the labor force—perhaps to obtain
more schooling and skills. If that is the
correct explanation, then potential
employment will be calculated much
differently from the number we saw in
the 1990s. In that case, attempting to
spur more rapid job growth with an
accommodative monetary policy is
exactly the wrong thing to do. It will not
accomplish the goal of maximum sus-
tainable growth in the long run, and it
may threaten our goal of price stability.
■ Conclusion
As economists—whether we work in
corporate life, the academic world, or
the policymaking realm—we are all in
the business of economic forecasting,
but each of us may approach our profes-
sion from a different perspective. 
The mission of the Federal Reserve leads
me to look at economic data—and the
very process of economic forecasting—
with a different purpose, and thus from a
somewhat different perspective than sim-
ply producing the most accurate GDP
forecast. Our motivation for forecasting
economic conditions begins with our
need to shape monetary policy to the
evolution of the economy as we work to
fulfill our dual mandate of price stability
and maximum sustainable growth. For
that reason, we look to the supply side as
well as the demand side of the economy
when evaluating conditions. 
I hope this discussion has helped clarify
how I approach my responsibilities as a
member—and this year a voting mem-
ber—of the Federal Open Market Com-
mittee. Armed with that knowledge, the
next time you hear news reports about
the FOMC’s decisions, I hope that you
will have an even deeper understanding
of the process I use: considering not
just the “whats” that make it into the
headlines, but thinking about the
“whys” that I carefully weigh, within
policy deliberations, in an effort to
maintain price stability and maximum
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